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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~ll~~L,'"LN GREENHALGH, I 
Plaintiff-Appellant~ 
vs. \ Case No. 
1~: L.\ i NE G. GREEN, administratrix 110169 
of the Estate of GERALD F. 
( ~ REEN, deceased, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS BRIEF 
STATEJYIENT OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out 
of an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court at a pretrial 
hearing granted a sum1nary judgment of No Cause of 
Action in fav-or of defendant and against plaintiff. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the entry of the sun1mary 
judgment and a decision remanding the case for trial 
by jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The complaint alleges that on the 18th day of 
October, 1963, plaintiff was a passenger in a 1963 Dodge 
panel truck camper being driven by Gerald F. Green. 
Th~t near the city of Beaver, Utah, he so negligently 
operated the truck as to cause an accident which resulted 
in his death and caused plaintiff to suffer personal in-
juries. (R. I). 
Defendant answered the complaint1 and denied 
plaintiff was a passenger in the truck and alleged as a 
defense to the claim of negligence that plaintiff was a 
guest passenger of the driver. ( R. 3) . 
At the pretrial conference defendant moved the 
court for a summary judgment on the ground plaintiff 
was a guest passenger and the complaint did not allege 
the accident was the result of any wilful misconduct 
on the part of the deceased driver. (R. 6). In support 
of this motion defendant had published and introduced 
into evidence the deposition of the plaintiff. The only 
testimony of' the plaintiff in the deposition that is ma-
terial· to this appeal is his statement concerning the 
relationship between himself and the deceased driver. 
With respect to this matter, plaintiff testified he was 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•1 !'rirnd of the deceased, and when the accident occurred 
tlwy were on a deer hunting expedition to Lost, Utah. 
I lr stated this was an annual trip, and the parties had 
left Salt Lake City that morning and were practically 
to their destination when the accident occurred. (Dep. 
{)). 
Plaintiff was then questioned concerning the man-
ner in which he was to pay for his ride. He testified that 
it had been agreed between the parties, Mr. Green and 
tlwir other companion, ~ir. Lockyer, and himself, that 
all of the expenses of the trip, including food, gas, 
ltnd oil and maintenance for the vehicle would be divid-
ed in three equal shares. (Dep. 16). Plaintiff testified 
each party was to retain the receipts for his respective 
purchases and there would be an accounting when the 
trip was completed. In accordance with this agreement, 
plaintiff and nlr. Lockyer paid $40.00 for the initial 
purchase of groceries and supplies, and the deceased 
paid for the costs of having the truck serviced for the 
trip. The only additional expenses incurred on this 
trip were at Holden, Utah, when plaintiff paid the sum 
of $6.4.3 for a tankful of gas. (Dep. 17, 18). 
The foregoing testimony was the only evidence 
introduced by defendant to support his contention that 
plaintiff was, as a 1natter of law, a guest passenger at 
the time of the accident. 
In opposition to the motion, counsel for plaintiff, 
by a proffer of proof, advised the pretrial judge that 
additional testin1ony would be introduced at the trial 
3 
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to the effect that sharing of expenses was compensation 
for the ride, and an inducement to the deceased to take 
his vehicle. (R. 18-19). 
The pretrial judge granted the motion for sum1nary 
judgment and ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff 
was a guest passenger. This erroneous ruling is the 
subject of plaintiff's appeal. (R. 6). 
POINT I 
TO JUSTIFY SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
THERE MUST BE NO GENUINE ISSUE OF 
FACT PRESENTED. 
The pretrial judge, in granting defendant's mo~ 
tion for summary judgment, ruled that there was no 
genuine issue of fact concerning the status of plain-
tiff. If an issue of fact existed with respect to this 
rna tter then the trial court committed error. See Young 
vs. Felornia~ 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862; Morris vs. 
Farnsworth Motel~ 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 298. 
In Abdulkabir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Com-
pany~ 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P .2d 339, this court stated: 
"V\Te are in accord with the idea that the right 
of trial by jury should be scrupulously safe-
guarded. This, of course, does not go as far as 
to require the submission to a jury of issues of 
fact merely because they are disputed. If they 
would not establish a basis upon which plaintiff 
could recover, no rna tter how they were resolved, 
it would be useless to consume time, effort and 
4 
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expense in trying the1n, the saving of which is 
the very purpose of summary judgment proce-
dun~. The pertinent inquiry is whether under 
any view of the facts the plaintiff could recover. 
It is acknowledged that in the face of a motion 
for dismissal on summary judgment, the plain-
tiff is entitled to have the trial court, and this 
court on review, consider all of the evidence 
which plaintiff is able to present, and every in-
ference and intendment fairly arising therefrom 
in the light most favorable to him." 
'Vith this controlling rule in mind plaintiff will 
now move on to a consideration of whether the pleadings 
and depositions and statements made at the pretrial 
conference present a genuine issue of fact that should 
have been presented to a jury. 
POINT II 
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN HOLDING THAT 
PL.A.INTIFF 'VAS A GUEST PAS SENGER. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that under the facts 
of this case the jury is the proper tribunal to determine 
the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased 
driver, Gerald Green. In support of this position, plain· 
tiff cites the recent case of Smith v. FranklinJ 14 Utah 
2d 16, 376 P.2d 541. In the Smith case plaintiff insti-
tuted ap action to recover damages for the death of 
one Ardith Smith, a cousin of the defendant driver . 
. Ardith S1nith, a resident of Tooele, Utah, told defend-
5 
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ant she needed to go to Salt Lake City to obtain a Joan 
and asked defendant to drive her there. Defendant 
advised Ardith Smith that defendant had no 1none~ 
for gasoline. Ardith agreed to pay and paid defendant 
$2.00 for the gas. On the return trip to Tooele there 
was an accident, and Ardith was killed~ 
The trial court denied defendant's motion for a 
directed -verdict and submitted to the jury the question 
of whether deceased was a passenger for hire or a guesl 
passenger. In affirming, this court stated: 
"The test is simple to state and under most 
circumstances is easy to apply: a passenger for 
hire is one who pays for his ride; a guest is one 
who is furnished a ride free of charge. The former 
is in the nature of a business transaction for 
money; whereas the latter is motivated by other 
considerations, usually of a social nature. Diffi-
culties are encountered where both factors are 
present in such a way that it does not appear with 
sufficient certainty to justify a ruling as a mat-
ter of law either that the rider was a guest or a 
passenger for hire. Where such uncertainty 
exists, the definition given by Sec. 41-9-2, U.C.A. 
1953, that a guest is 'a person who accepts a ride 
in any vehicle without giving cmnpensation there-
for,' does provide the conclusive answer. The 
question arises as to what constitutes 'cmnpen-
, sation' sufficient to change what normally would 
be a guest to a passenger for hire. 
"It must be conceded that where it is shown 
that the rider is basically a social guest, neither 
the giving of just 'any compensation,' ·which 
might be· some inconsequential amount of money 
6 
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or other consideration of value, nor even the 
sharing of expenses, merely in social reciproca-
tion for the ride, would change the relationship 
to that of passenger for hire. The phrase 'com-
pensation thereof' as used in the statute means 
cmnpensation for the ride. Therefore, it would 
have to be sufficient money (or other thing of 
value) that it reasonably could be supposed that 
the parties so regarded it. But whether there is 
profit in the transaction is obviously not the 
determining factor. Where payment for the ride 
is the main inducement for it, the fact that there 
Inay also exist smne social incentive which makes 
giving the ride enjoyable or desirable for the 
drh·er woudl not change its character to that of 
host and guest. 
"Howsoever convenient or expedient it may be 
to see _things as either black or white and to 
a ,-oid perplexing problems in the twilight areas 
of uncertainty, that cannot always be done. 
fVhere both payment and social incentive are 
prcsc 11 t, and the evidence would support a find-
i nrJ that each exerted a substantial influence on 
hauling the passenger_, the problem as to the rela-
tionship between the parties must be faced up 
to and resolved by S'lilbmitting the issue to the 
,i u ry (or fact trier) . (Emphasis supplied) . 
"From our consideration of this subject and the 
authorities which have dealt with it, we are per-
suaded that the sound and practical view is that 
the determination should be made on the basis 
of which was the chief inducement for giving the 
ride. Although the instructions which were given 
are not so faultless as to be beyond criticism, 
if their treatment of this subject is considered 
in the composite, the jury was adequately so ad-
7 
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vised in language not unfavorable to the plain-
tiff. In the absence of error prejudicial to her, 
a reversal and granting of a new trial is not 
warranted. 
"It is apparent that the trial court regarding 
· the evidence as showing that even if it be true 
that Lorrie would not h!-ve taken the trip except 
for the request and as a favor to her cousin Ar-
dith, it also could reasonably be found that she 
would not have taken the trip except for the fact 
that Ardith furnished the $2.00. Under those 
.circumstances, it was discreet and proper to refer 
the disputed issue to the jury for determination." 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the ruling by the 
pretrial judge is contrary to the above decision. 
It will be recalled the only evidence in this case 
is the testimony in the deposition of the plaintiff. Plain-
tiff testified in this deposition that the purpose of the 
trip was a deer hunting expedition, but he also testified 
he agreed to pay for his ride by sharing the expenses 
incurred for the trip. 
Page 16, Line 15: 
"Q. Did you and l'dr. Green and Mr. Lockyer 
have any agreement or understanding 
amongst yourselves as to how the expenses 
of this hunting trip was going to be taken 
care of? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was your agreement? 
A. We would split it three ways. 
Q. In other words, you were going to share 
all the expenses equally? 
A. Yes." 
8 
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The foregoing testimony and the inferences to be 
drawn therefron1 in the light Inost favorable to plaintiff 
dearly establish that the payment by plaintiff for his 
shure of' the expenses was one of the inducements of 
the trip .. A jury could well have found that unless plain-
tiff had paid his share, he would not have been per-
mitted to ride in the truck. We submit that both pay-
ment and social incentive were present in this case. The 
drawing of inferences and formulating of conclusions 
frmn the facts was properly for the jury. A jury could 
reasonably find that the deceased would not have taken 
the trip unless plaintiff agreed to share the expenses. 
The trial court held as a matter of law that the sharing 
of expenses by plaintiff was not an inducement for the 
ride. This ruling is clearly contrary to the Smith case, 
supra, and should not be permitted to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the evidence 
presented an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was 
a guest passenger or a passenger for hire, and that 
this issue should have been left to the jury. This Honor-
able Court should reaffirm the Smith case and reverse 
the decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R.A.\VLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & 
BLACK 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
9 
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